Rob Lee

Rob Lee @RALee85

When I wrote about the war in April, there were two key questions: how much attrition had Ukraine sustained (could they counterattack soon?) and how would Russia solve its manpower issues? It is now clear that Ukraine also sustained heavy losses at the beginning of the war. 18/ https://t.co/8ZU2naXf6M — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

@shashj Not a full list, and Krasny Luch on June 16 was probably the most significant, but BBC's Russian service is tracking them. https://t.co/5WpVUbGi3Z https://t.co/1isz61VwFK — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

HIMARS will help disrupt future Russian offensives by reducing its critical artillery/MLRS advantage, but they won't retake terrain. Also, the limiting factor for HIMARS isn't the number of launchers, but the number of GMLRS and other munitions, which aren't in large supply. 17/ — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Because of HIMARS' range/accuracy, Kyiv only has to fire a small # of munitions a day to achieve significant effects. GPS-guided GMLRS can be launched at night when Russian UAVs are less able to detect them, and they can drive away before being engaged.16/ https://t.co/hT2oMCnpeA — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

HIMARS are already playing a critical role by targeting Russian ammo depots (along with Tochka-U) and command posts, which are both Russian military vulnerabilities due to its centralized decision-making and anachronistic supply. And Ukraine is using them judiciously. 15/ https://t.co/kYMPrtS8cV — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Ukraine now has a decent number of self-propelled PzH 2000, Caesar, M109A3GN, and AHS Krab howitzers as well as M777 in service and enough ammunition to not have to be overly conservative, which reduces Russia's artillery advantage. They are also receiving more PGM rounds. 14/ https://t.co/Y2yMuc4rbA — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

I'm not sure about Siversk, but Ukraine should have better prospects for holding its lines around Slovyansk/Kramatorsk. Ukraine can provide better air defense and artillery coverage in that area, and Ukraine now has greater experience operating new NATO artillery and MLRS. 13/ — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Because their loss doesn't affect Ukraine's ability to fight this war. My view was that relative losses was the more strategically important metric to use for the battle for the Donbas. It seems Russia took heavier losses in April-May, but that may have changed in May-June. 12/ — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

The capture of Severodonetsk/Lysychansk are victories for Russia. They are important for domestic support (which would be far lower if the offensive stalled), a sense of momentum, and likely for recruiting efforts, but their loss isn't that strategically significant for Kyiv. 11/ — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Some Russian sources have said the pace of Russia's advance depended on the presence of Orlan-30 UAVs, which, unlike Orlan-10, can laze targets for Krasnopol PGM artillery rounds. The use of commercial UAVs also became critical for both sides for ISR and artillery targeting. 10/ https://t.co/qWoZ5a3iHK — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Russia's problem was that it was using a mix of amalgamated and volunteer/reserve/mobilized LDNR units for much of the fighting after sustaining heavy losses in Feb-March. So its advances were slow and depended heavily on having a significant advantage in fires to compensate. 9/ — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Not surprisingly, Russia had most of its success pushing westward from the easternmost part of the front, but Ukraine's northern and southern flanks largely held. The main strategic threat was that a large group of Ukrainian forces would be encircled, but this didn't occur. 8/ https://t.co/WFu4yVyKYV — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Consequently, Russia was able to use airpower (though it still couldn't interdict) and artillery more effectively. It could use shorter-range MLRS like the TOS-1A with less risk of counter-battery fire because long-range Ukrainian arty was farther away. 7/ https://t.co/hM7EFOldP0 — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

The nature of the salient was also disadvantages for Kyiv. In order to provide effective air defense and artillery coverage for the easternmost units, Kyiv would have to move long-range systems into the salient, which could be targeted by arty on the flanks. (map from June 11) 6/ https://t.co/PoLVJRhjg2 — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Unlike in Feb-March, Russia maximized its advantage in fires. It wasn't pretty and the artillery strikes often weren't that accurate, but persistent artillery fire is tough for any soldiers to withstand and it eventually wore down Ukrainian units that couldn't always rotate. 5/ https://t.co/9qTIXw7JCB — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Russian forces made better use of EW, AD, counter-battery fire, dismounted infantry, armor (the rate of tank losses is far lower than in Feb-March), and units began procuring their own commercial UAVs, which they said was critical, particularly having enough to replace losses. 4/ https://t.co/FZbxRJ5wBf — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Some of this was adaptations, but it was mostly the Russian military fighting according to its doctrine and using combined arms, which it didn't in Feb-March. There was more evidence of the use of the recon-fire complex and a better integration of artillery, UAVs, and maneuver.3/ — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

From April through mid-May, Russia only had limited success in the Donbas, and its forces continued to commit a number of costly tactical mistakes, most notably during a series of river crossings around May 9. However, Russian forces have performed better since mid-May. 2/ — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Thread on the current status of the war. I wrote about the battle for the Donbas in April, and I think it still applies. The war is now primarily about sustainability and relative losses, which is how we should view Russia's successes in Luhansk. https://t.co/9C5ZWkbLb9 https://t.co/kSNqyQKhEi — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

The Deputy Commander of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division for military-political affairs, Colonel Alexey Avramchenko, was also reportedly killed. 4/ https://t.co/6asIxNCq0D https://t.co/uzkMUkhh4q https://t.co/2HVlSLoGSY — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

The deaths of two of the officers mentioned by Tsyambalyuk, Kens and Gorobets, have been confirmed by Russian sources. — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

613/ https://t.co/ExOZcdeNsw — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

3/ https://t.co/ExOZcdeNsw — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Colonel Alexey Gorobets, the commander of Russia's recently reestablished 20th Motorized Rifle Division, was killed in Ukraine. https://t.co/NJZtR3uhaK https://t.co/Yx8R7vZgFa https://t.co/wP28z1inJz https://t.co/kH1hFvBzLl https://t.co/qnMKX7B9t9 — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Video from inside a Russian T-90M tank firing on targets in Ukraine. https://t.co/DfMACHXZNo https://t.co/fdSMFlJbC3 — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

3549/ https://t.co/hpi4E8mqKy — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Donated equipment for Ukraine's 25th Airborne Brigade, including Kvertus KVS G-6 C-UAS guns, Iridium satellite phones, Autel UAVs, and Pulsar thermal weapon sights. https://t.co/WkTiWpZ5ef https://t.co/sMCXzZweZP — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

7/ https://t.co/3MlOOQkNDo — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

Photos from the aftermath of yesterday’s strike in Nova Kakhovka. https://t.co/jpU4cPxNHI https://t.co/vmQc5y2Yre — PolitiTweet.org

Rob Lee @RALee85

2/ https://t.co/gxYjk3d7bi — PolitiTweet.org